Terminal Evaluation Review form, GEF Independent Evaluation Office, APR 2016

# 1. Project Data

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| Summary project data |
| GEF project ID  | 4286 |
| GEF Agency project ID | P122701 |
| GEF Replenishment Phase | GEF-4 |
| Lead GEF Agency (include all for joint projects) | World Bank |
| Project name | Wildlife Consumption in Vietnam: Reforming Policies and Practices to Strengthen Biodiversity Conservation |
| Country/Countries | Vietnam |
| Region | Asia |
| Focal area | Biodiversity |
| Operational Program or Strategic Priorities/Objectives | BD-2 Mainstream Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Use into Production Landscapes/Seascapes and Sectors |
| Executing agencies involved | VEA – MONRE, BCA |
| NGOs/CBOs involvement | Through consultation and contributions provided: WCS, British Council, Freeland Foundation |
| Private sector involvement | N/S |
| CEO Endorsement (FSP) /Approval date (MSP) | November 15, 2011 |
| Effectiveness date / project start | June 8th, 2012 |
| Expected date of project completion (at start) | November 1st, 2015 |
| Actual date of project completion | May 2015 |
| Project Financing |
|  | **At Endorsement (US $M)** | **At Completion (US $M)** |
| Project Preparation Grant | GEF funding | 0 | 0 |
| Co-financing | 0.0262 | 0.0262 |
| GEF Project Grant | 1 | 1 |
| Co-financing | IA own | 0 | 0 |
| Government | 0.505 | 0.505 |
| Other multi- /bi-laterals | 1 | 1 |
| Private sector | 0 | 0 |
| NGOs/CSOs | 0.285 | 0.285 |
| Total GEF funding | 1 | 1 |
| Total Co-financing | 1.8162 | 1.8162 |
| Total project funding (GEF grant(s) + co-financing) | 2.8162 | 2.8162 |
| Terminal evaluation/review information |
| TE completion date | UA |
| Author of TE | Maurice Andres Rawlins |
| TER completion date |  |
| TER prepared by | Mathias Einberger |
| TER peer review by (if GEF IEO review) | Molly Watts |

# 2. Summary of Project Ratings

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| Criteria | Final PIR | IA Terminal Evaluation | IA Evaluation Office Review | GEF IEO Review |
| Project Outcomes | S | S | NR | MS |
| Sustainability of Outcomes |  | ML | NR | MU |
| M&E Design |  | NR | NR | MS |
| M&E Implementation |  | NR | NR | U |
| Quality of Implementation  |  | S | NR | S |
| Quality of Execution |  | S | NR | S |
| Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report |  | - | - | MS |

# 3. Project Objectives

## 3.1 Global Environmental Objectives of the project:

The project aimed to reduce illegal wildlife consumption and trade by focusing on the demand for such wildlife in Vietnam. Many species threatened on a global level are traded internationally in part to meet domestic demand in Vietnam – rhino horns, tigers and tiger parts are only a few examples. By reducing domestic demand for illegal wildlife consumption in Vietnam, global co-benefits can be unlocked. The Global Tiger Initiative has helped to galvanize international support and attention for an iconic animal species that both needs global protection and can help mobilize global support for conservation efforts. The tiger can benefit directly from demand reductions for tigers and tiger parts and indirectly from demand reductions for wildlife in its prey base. In light of global investments such as the GEF's effort to support the Government of Vietnam in habitat protection, "empty forests" have become a considerable concern in Vietnam. If not supplemented by efforts to decrease the consumption of wildlife, the value of these efforts may be diminished. (PIF 2011, pp. 11-12)

## 3.2 Development Objectives of the project:

The project’s development objective was "to strengthen biodiversity conservation through significant reduction of illegal wildlife consumption in Vietnam." (PIF 2011, p. 1)

It aimed to achieve its objective through three project components (excl. project management):

1. Strengthening policies and legal frameworks
2. Monitoring and enforcement of consumption controls
3. Building awareness to change behaviors

## 3.3 Were there any **changes** in the Global Environmental Objectives, Development Objectives, or other activities during implementation?

From the initial PIF submitted in 2010 to the final 2011 PIF, there were slight changes in the wording of the project's global environmental objectives in order to improve clarity. No substantial changes were made and the project's development objective also remained unchanged throughout implementation.

# 4. GEF IEO assessment of Outcomes and Sustainability

Please refer to the GEF Terminal Evaluation Review Guidelines for detail on the criteria for ratings.

## Relevance can receive either a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating. For Effectiveness and Cost efficiency, a six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess. Sustainability ratings are assessed on a four-point scale: Likely=no or negligible risk; Moderately Likely=low risk; Moderately Unlikely=substantial risks; Unlikely=high risk. In assessing a Sustainability rating please note if, and to what degree, sustainability of project outcomes is threatened by financial, sociopolitical, institutional/governance, or environmental factors.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

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| 4.1 Relevance  | Rating: Satisfactory |

The government of Vietnam recognizes illegal wildlife trade as one of the key drivers of biodiversity loss in Vietnam. This project addresses that issue by focusing on a reduction of wildlife consumption, which is in turn an important driver of illegal wildlife trade. It therefore contributes directly to Vietnam's national efforts to stop illegal wildlife trade and meet its obligations under CITES and CBD. (TE p.3)

The project is also in line with the Biodiversity Focal Area Strategy for GEF-5, contributing directly to its second objective: Mainstream Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Use into Production Landscapes/Seascapes and Sectors, but also contributing indirectly to its first objective: Improve Sustainability of Protected Area Systems, by attempting to address Vietnam's "empty forest" problem.

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| 4.2 Effectiveness  | Rating: Moderately Satisfactory |

The TE provides ratings for the project objectives as well as for each of the three project components' outcomes and the corresponding outputs. The TE rates each item as at least Satisfactory and provides useful assessments of mostly intermediary outputs of the project, but it does not offer a convincing evaluation of the project's aspired final outcomes based on valid indicators, first and foremost a significant reduction of illegal wildlife consumption in Vietnam. The project shows many important intermediary achievements but a lack of planning for realistically obtainable indicators and/or a lack of rigor in collecting the necessary data prevent a more thorough showing of the achievement of final outcomes.

The TE further notes that surveys indicate there is a large pool of aspirational wildlife consumers only waiting for enough disposable income to spend on wildlife products. Therefore, despite the project's stated development objective to significantly reduce demand for illegal wildlife consumption, market demand looks set to continue as increased awareness, in part catalyzed by the project, has apparently not yet translated to changes in attitudes and behavior. (TE p. 16)

This TER rates effectiveness as Moderately Satisfactory. A breakdown by project components is given below.

**Project Objective**

The TE rates achievement of the project development objective as Satisfactory. The TE does not substantiate this assessment but instead refers to the mid-term review. The TE here is either inadequate, because the PIR does not contain any more relevant information, or it refers to some document other than the PIR, which is not available to the TER reviewer.

**Component 1: Strengthen Policies and Legal Frameworks**

The TE rates the outcome of component 1, "a more effective policy and legal framework", as Satisfactory according to the designated indicator "completeness and consistency of legal and policy framework". The TE highlights that there were notable efforts to strengthen the legal framework for wildlife conservation, such as a new National Strategy on Biodiversity for Vietnam, a Circular issued by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE), and government Decrees. (TE p. 5) However, the TE also notes that there is no official structure in place to track and assess the impacts of such improvements in the legal framework. (TE pp. 7, 19)

The TE individually assessed the New National Strategy on biodiversity to 2020, the Action Plan on Wildlife Trade Control (2010-2020), and improved regulations on illegal wildlife trade and consumption, as the three outputs under component 1, each rated Satisfactory. The New National Strategy on biodiversity to 2020 or National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, endorsed by the Prime Minister in 2011 and approved in 2013, was completed before the review of the legal and policy framework on wildlife trade under the project was completed, however the preliminary findings of the review were included. Instead of a new 2010-2020 Action Plan on Wildlife Trade Control, a Presidential Directive on strengthening measures to control and protect endangered wildlife was issued in 2014, which was also informed by the review. Finally, MONRE issued Decree 160 in 2013, to strengthen the regulatory framework for wildlife trade and management. (TE pp. 5-6)

**Component 2: Monitoring and Enforcement of Consumption Controls**

The TE rates the outcome of component 2 as Satisfactory, but does not use the originally designated indicator in request for CEO endorsement "percentage of restaurants which serve wildlife". It instead refers to surveys conducted before and after the wildlife enforcement campaigns that captured a 40 to 60 percent decrease in the number of retailers engaging in wildlife sale and trade violations. The TE further takes note of a web-based wildlife database and reporting system that was developed under this project. The database is aimed to facilitate inter-agency information exchange. (TE p. 7)

The TE rates output 1 of this component, "strengthened capacity of municipal enforcement teams and judicial authorities in demonstration areas", Satisfactory. Over 700 enforcement and management officials from Hanoi and elsewhere in Vietnam have been trained to improve awareness and were provided with communication toolkits. The toolkit was distributed to all government agencies and communist party offices and an ID guide for species under Decree 160 as well as an introduction to Decree 160 were distributed to all law enforcement agencies. Correspondence by the CCPE to support ongoing communication campaigns on wildlife protection and an explanatory manual for wildlife law enforcement were also developed. The Wildlife Conservation Society further provided training for staff of the Hanoi Environmental Policy, while training of judicial authorities is being provided by other NGOs, such as TRAFFIC. The TE rated output 2, the "number of enforcement campaigns implemented with support from Vietnam- WEN", also Satisfactory, as two major enforcement campaigns were undertaken as part of the project. They targeted 20 prioritized retailers suspected of non-compliance with wildlife regulation, out of about 2,340 retailers surveyed. There were substantial efforts to provide enforcement officials with guidance and training for strategic and intelligence-based enforcement, such as through an operational manual on gathering and using data for planning and decision-making, or through training provided by WCS in the use of geospatial tools to aid wildlife trade management. (TE p. 8-9)

**Component 3: Building Awareness to Change Behaviors**

The TE rates the outcome of component 3, "health sector and government and private sectors reduce illegal wildlife consumption", as Highly Satisfactory in its rating overview (TE p.5) but only as Satisfactory later on when assessing each component in detail. In any case, it does so without a reliable indicator. "Reduced sales of endangered species in TCM shops" was designated as indicator in the request for CEO endorsement, with indicator species to be determined. The TE notes that "[t]he project encountered difficulty in collecting baseline data on sales volume of selected species of wildlife, due to the unwillingness of retailers to disclose such information." The TE however praises active participation by the Ministry of Health and the CCPE in efforts to raise awareness about the illegality of the wildlife trade as a success of the project's multi-stakeholder approach. (TE p. 9)

The TE rates output 1, "new public health guidance and policies reflect disease transmission risks and legality/conservation issue" as Satisfactory. The corresponding guidance was issued in March 2015 to provincial and municipal departments of health, medicine businesses clinics, research centers, and medical practitioners by the MOH. It focused on the illegal nature of the wildlife trade and sought to raise awareness about the need for wildlife conservation, while also emphasizing the need to find alternatives to using wildlife in traditional medicine as well as regular inspections of medicine businesses. The TE also rates "internal party guidance on illegal wildlife consumption for party members" (output 2) as Satisfactory, as such guidance was provided with Guideline #98 on not consuming wildlife, issued by the CCPE in December 2013. It instructs all party levels to develop communication and propaganda plans against the illegal consuming, trading and using of wildlife and wild plants. The following year, a review workshop on the guideline's implementation was co-hosted by MONRE and the CCPE and showed some good initial results. As a follow-up, the CCPE issued correspondence to urge the continuation of efforts to implement Guideline 98 as well as the wildlife communication toolkit DVD produced under this project. (TE pp. 10-11)

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| 4.3 Efficiency | Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory |

In light of the information available to the reviewer, the TER rates the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the project as moderately unsatisfactory.

The project was highly successful in materializing co-financing worth about 180% of the GEF grant, so the 1 million USD provided by the GEF could achieve a significant leverage. (TE p. 11)

The disbursement of the funds was initially delayed however, largely due to unfamiliarity with World Bank procedures and financial management. (TE p. 17) This resulted in a delay of the project's implementation and may have contributed to an inadequate timeframe being left for both implementation and thorough evaluation.

As has been described in section 4.2 on effectiveness, the TE could not show a convincing achievement of the project's stated development objective of significantly reducing illegal wildlife demand in Vietnam. This may be due to an inadequate M&E system to convincingly document any such achievements and/or it may be due to an inadequate timeframe available because of the mentioned initial delays. The project was however successful in achieving many if not most of its more intermediary outputs and outcomes. Disbursements of funds also greatly improved after the noted initial delays, and the TE positively highlights the project's efficient multi-stakeholder approach in ensuring co-ownership across different government ministries and agencies, as well as co-funding from different government and non-government sources. The TE further notes the project's efficiency in selecting key target groups for in awareness raising interventions, in order to use limited resources to achieve a large impact, as well as its use of existing government systems and channels during the entire implementation. (TE p. 11)

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| 4.4 Sustainability | Rating: Moderately Unlikely |

The TE rates the overall risk to the sustainability of the project's development outcome as low, citing several design elements of the project. However, the TE in this evaluation apparently does not take into account sustainability along financial and environmental risk factors.

**Financial resources: Moderately Unlikely.** The TE notes that continued technical and financial support is crucial to continue the momentum of this project, the results of which may not be sustainable without further support. This is because rising levels of awareness have not yet lead to a change in attitudes and behavior regarding wildlife consumption in Vietnam, which would require sustained engagement. The ability to provide especially the financial commitment to sustain such engagement however, has not been demonstrated in the project and may be a strong indicator of the need for a follow up project according to the TE. (TE pp. 16-17) Discussions between the World Bank and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment regarding such a follow up project have been under way at the time of writing of the TE. (TE p. 14)

**Sociopolitical. Moderately Likely.** The multi-stakeholder approach of the project contributes to its sociopolitical sustainability. Its institutional structure comprises a project steering committee that includes the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE), the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Ministry of Health, the Central Committee for Propaganda Education, the Hanoi People's Committee and the Ministry of Public Security, as well as a project management unit hosted by the Biodiversity Conservation Agency (BCA) within MONRE. (TE p. 17) Throughout the project, each of the thereby involved ministries have so taken ownership of the wildlife trade issue and incorporated it in their respective programmes. (TE p. 15) Yet the TE notes that continuing interventions by the BCA and other government agencies are needed in order to provide updates on wildlife trade, helping ministries to keep up with their responsibilities to implement the Prime Minister’s Decree on Combating Wildlife Trafficking. (TE pp. 15-16)

**Institutional framework and governance: Moderately Likely.** The project has contributed to the strengthening of the legal framework for wildlife management in Vietnam, the inclusion of which in the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan signals the GoV's interest in sustained efforts to curb illegal wildlife trade. The implementation of that plan however will require continued effort and resources, none of which should be taken for granted. A further expansion and deepening of inter-agency partnerships will also be crucial – for example between the Hanoi's People Committee, which already carries out regular enforcement campaigns against illegal trade, and the Environmental Police, or between the Environmental Police and Vietnam-WEN, which would be important due to the cross-border nature of illegal wildlife trade. (TE p. 16)

**Environmental:** The TE does not note any environmental risks to the continuation of project benefits and no other information on environmental sustainability is available.

# 5. Processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes

## 5.1 Co-financing. To what extent was the reported co-financing essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project’s outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The project managed to materialize $1.79 million of total co-financing (excl. $26,000 for project preparation), the majority of which came from government contributions through MONRE (borrowing $1 million from the ADB). This level of commitment and ownership from the government was likely instrumental in galvanizing support across different government ministries and agencies. The amount of realized co-financing also exceeded the amount initially anticipated in the first PIF from 2010 by $440,000. Contrary to that initial plan, no private sector co-financing was realized, however as it was never an integral part of the budget, and as co-financing already exceeded what was expected, this did not appear to have an impact on project outcomes. (PIF 2010, p. 3; PIF 2011, p. 3)

## 5.2 Project extensions and/or delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project’s outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

As mentioned under 4.3, project implementation was initially delayed due to a delay in the disbursement of the funds, stemming largely from unfamiliarity within the project management unit with World Bank procedures and financial management. (TE p. 17) The TE notes that more time would have been needed for developing partnerships. The project was thus limited in fully developing and activating some important partnerships, including with the private sector and other stakeholders such as the Ministry of Education and Training or the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism. (TE p. 19) Both sustainability and effectiveness of the project may have suffered as a result.

## 5.3 Country ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability, highlighting the causal links:

As already mentioned under 5.2, through the provision of the majority of co-financing, but also due to the cross-ministerial institutional setup of the project described under 4.4, the GoV took virtually complete ownership in the project.

# 6. Assessment of project’s Monitoring and Evaluation system

Ratings are assessed on a six point scale: Highly Satisfactory=no shortcomings in this M&E component; Satisfactory=minor shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Satisfactory=moderate shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Unsatisfactory=significant shortcomings in this M&E component; Unsatisfactory=major shortcomings in this M&E component; Highly Unsatisfactory=there were no project M&E systems.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

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| 6.1 M&E Design at entry  | Rating: Moderately Satisfactory |

The TE does not include a discussion on M&E design and implementation of the project.

The request for CEO endorsement includes a detailed breakdown of project objective, outcomes and outputs by indicators, baseline, target values, means of verification and assumptions. The project objective indicators, "consumption of wild meat in preceding 12 month period" and "percentage of population who are current users of bear bile as a traditional medicine", appear appropriate, as does the suggested plan to use existing study results as preliminary baseline to be confirmed by a new survey within the first six months of the project. For component 1 of the project however, the chosen outcome indicator "completeness and consistency of legal and policy framework" is hardly specific and measurable enough for a thorough evaluation. The outcome indicator "percentage of restaurants which serve wildlife" of component 2 appears sufficient, as does the indicator "reduced sales of endangered species in TCM shops" for the outcome of component 3 (although the choice of species for this indicator species was yet to be determined at the time of submission of the PIF). Since there was no baseline available for either indicator, the PIF envisioned an appropriate pre- and post-intervention survey for each project component. (PIF 2011, pp. 20-21)

Despite substantial effort on improving the formulation of concrete objectives and measurable indicators from the first PIF submitted in 2010 to the request for CEO endorsement, the project still did not lay out any detailed plans for M&E implementation and schedule. The final PIF merely notes that "[t]he project team will develop a detailed work plan for the project at inception phase to help the project reach its targets." (PIF 2011, p. 4)

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| 6.2 M&E Implementation  | Rating: Unsatisfactory |

The TE does not provide a rating for M&E Implementation, or any discussion of it. This TER rates M&E implementation as unsatisfactory, due to the lack of reporting on project objective indicators in the one PIR available and the terminal evaluation. The PIR does not include the project objective indicators laid out in the final PIF, described in the section above. Neither the PIR nor the TE adequately addresses progress on the project development objective (to "strengthen biodiversity conservation through significant reduction of illegal wildlife consumption in Vietnam") and provide very little information on their respective evaluation strategy in this regard.

Neither the PIR nor the TE includes a clearly measurable indicator for project component 1 in line with the SMART criteria.

The PIR includes the quantitative indicators for project components 2 and 3 ("percentage of restaurants which serve wildlife" and "reduced sales of endangered species in TCM shops") specified in the request for CEO endorsement.

For the component 2 outcome indicator, the PIR notes that the survey to establish a baseline had been initiated by November 2013. (PIR p. 4) The TE under component 2 however only refers to a survey capturing a decrease in the number of retailers engaging in wildlife sale and trade violations, not the "percentage of restaurants which serve wildlife" as specified in the PIF and PIR. (TE p. 7) None of projects the documents available to the terminal evaluation review mention or justify this apparent change in outcome indictor, nor do they describe the result of the baseline survey mentioned in the PIR.

For the component 3 outcome indicator, the PIR notes that data wasn't available yet, as the consultant had just started to implement the contract. (PIR p. 4) The TE shows that the necessary data on the "reduced sales of endangered species in TCM shops" could never be collected, noting that the collection of economic data on illegal and/or informal activities is often challenging and this choice of indicator was therefore probably unrealistic to begin with. (TE p. 19) There is no mention in the TE about the exploration of alternative strategies to measure the outcome of component 3.

# 7. Assessment of project implementation and execution

Quality of Implementation includes the quality of project design, as well as the quality of supervision and assistance provided by implementing agency(s) to execution agencies throughout project implementation. Quality of Execution covers the effectiveness of the executing agency(s) in performing its roles and responsibilities. In both instances, the focus is upon factors that are largely within the control of the respective implementing and executing agency(s). A six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

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| 7.1 Quality of Project Implementation  | Rating: Satisfactory |

The implementing agency of the project was the World Bank. The TE rates the Bank's performance Satisfactory. The Bank maintained a task team, including task management, financial management and procurement, throughout the project to provide supervision. It conducted a supervision mission, two post procurement reviews and a mid-term review. Regular management, liaison and progress reporting was also provided according to the TE. The Bank also provided training in financial management and procurement to the executing agency's project team. (TE p. 17) The TE does not mention any training and/or guidance provided on M&E. The project was overall well designed, with measurable indicators for most of its components defined.

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| 7.2 Quality of Project Execution  | Rating: Satisfactory |

The executing agency of the project was MONRE / BCA. A project steering committee, including representation from MONRE, MARD, MOH, CCPE, HanoiPC and MPS, as well as a project management unit, comprising a project director, two project deputy directory, a project manager, a chief accountant and project staff, were hosted by BCA. The TE rates the executing agency's performance Satisfactory. The project initially started slowly, because of the project management unit's unfamiliarity with Bank systems and regulations. A work plan, a financial management manual, accounting software and a procurement guide were adopted by the project management unit. The project manager's role was integral in ensuring compliance with Bank systems. After the first year of the project, disbursement of funds and project implementation both increased rapidly. The TE further notes that all task carried out by the executing agency were largely in compliance with Bank rules and procedures. (TE p. 19)

# 8. Assessment of Project Impacts

***Note - In instances where information on any impact related topic is not provided in the terminal evaluations, the reviewer should indicate in the relevant sections below that this is indeed the case and identify the information gaps. When providing information on topics related to impact, please cite the page number of the terminal evaluation from where the information is sourced.***

8.1 Environmental Change. Describe the changes in environmental stress and environmental status that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

The TE does not take note of any environmental changes occurring over the course of the project.

8.2 Socioeconomic change. Describe any changes in human well-being (income, education, health, community relationships, etc.) that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

The TE briefly notes that there is a large pool of aspirational or intending wildlife consumers in Vietnam, of whom surveys indicate that they merely await more disposable income to be available for spending on wildlife products that are perceived as luxury goods. (TE p. 16) The TE does not indicate that the project resulted in any socioeconomic changes in Vietnam. However, if or when such changes occur, namely rising income status, stresses on wildlife may be escalated in absence of further measures to change people's attitudes and behavior.

8.3 Capacity and governance changes. Describe notable changes in capacities and governance that can lead to large-scale action (both mass and legislative) bringing about positive environmental change. “Capacities” include awareness, knowledge, skills, infrastructure, and environmental monitoring systems, among others. “Governance” refers to decision-making processes, structures and systems, including access to and use of information, and thus would include laws, administrative bodies, trust-building and conflict resolution processes, information-sharing systems, etc. Indicate how project activities contributed to/ hindered these changes, as well as how contextual factors have influenced these changes.

a) Capacities

The TE notes that the project stimulated and mobilized interest among different government agencies, due to the cross-ministerial/cross-agency composition of the project steering committee, as well as due to regular information sharing and communication with stakeholders using a broad set of communication tools. (TE p. 15) The TE further reports active participation of the MOH and the CCPE in awareness raising efforts about the illegality of wildlife trade as a success of the project. (TE p. 9)

These efforts to raise awareness among the public through the MOH, but also through the Central Youth Union and the TCM, have shown some impact during the project. However, increased knowledge about the illegality of wildlife trade and consumption apparently has not yet translated into corresponding changes in attitudes and behavior. (TE p. 16)

Over 700 enforcement and management officials in total, from Hanoi and other parts of the country, have been trained to improve communication skills and were provided with communication toolkits in an effort to better raise awareness within the communities. (TE p. 8)

Under the project, a web-based wildlife database and reporting system has also been developed, involving several enforcement agencies in Hanoi as well as the national Environmental Police. It is designed to facilitate inter-agency information sharing, intelligence-led enforcement campaigns, and the monitoring of wildlife crime in Hanoi. (TE p. 7)

b) Governance

The two major enforcement campaigns carried out under the project were guided by an operational manual providing a strategic approach to enforcement that focuses on gathering and using data for planning and decision-making. The manual can be a useful tool to plan similar campaigns in the future, bringing structure and improved efficiency to implementation of wildlife campaigns. (TE p. 8)

The TE notes that MONRE is working with the Hanoi People’s Committee to have these enforcement campaigns become regular activity, for example through integrating them in the annual illegal trade campaigns in Hanoi around the Tet holidays. (TE p. 9)

The project also contributed to an improvement in Vietnam's legal and policy framework for wildlife management, starting with a review and gap analysis of the relevant legal framework that improved the understanding among key line ministries and agencies about these gaps and the corresponding priority areas. Policies introduced as a result include Guideline 98-HD/BTGTW on enhancing communication to reduce illegal wildlife trade and consumption, MOH Correspondence 79 on a joint action plan for protecting biodiversity, Decree 160 on strengthening the regulatory framework for wildlife trade and management, CCPE Correspondence 7584- CV/BTGTW on supporting ongoing communication campaigns on wildlife protection, a MONRE circular on the establishment of a biodiversity and conservation facility to support efforts to combat wildlife trade, and Decree 40 issued to address some of the conflicts with respect to Decree 157 and MONRE correspondences. (TE p. 12)

The TE further notes the establishment of the Wildlife Partnership Forum as a coordinating mechanism for activities to combat illegal wildlife trade. Directed by the BCA it can ensure continued coordination in wildlife trade management, especially, in implementation and the use of resources. (TE p. 16) Members of the forum include various stakeholders such as government ministries (MOH, MPS, MARD, MONRE, MoJ), international and local NGOs (WSP, PanNature, ENV, WWF, FFI, TRAFFIC), research institutions (IEBR, CRES), rescue centers, international institutions (WB, ADB, USAID), embassies, and individual experts. The forum has coordinated regular meetings on a 2-month basis in order to provide updates on activities, share information and find chances to collaborate. (TE p. 13)

The online database developed under the project, as well as training in geospatial tools provided to enforcement officials by WCS, can further facilitate inter-agency information sharing and information transfer (TE pp. 7, 9)

8.4 Unintended impacts. Describe any impacts not targeted by the project, whether positive or negative, affecting either ecological or social aspects. Indicate the factors that contributed to these unintended impacts occurring.

The TE does not report unintended impacts separately. It features a combined section for general development, unintended and unrelated impacts. There are no ecological, social or other unintended impacts listed. (TE pp. 12-14)

8.5 Adoption of GEF initiatives at scale. Identify any initiatives (e.g. technologies, approaches, financing instruments, implementing bodies, legal frameworks, information systems) that have been mainstreamed, replicated and/or scaled up by government and other stakeholders by project end. Include the extent to which this broader adoption has taken place, e.g. if plans and resources have been established but no actual adoption has taken place, or if market change and large-scale environmental benefits have begun to occur. Indicate how project activities and other contextual factors contributed to these taking place. If broader adoption has not taken place as expected, indicate which factors (both project-related and contextual) have hindered this from happening.

Many of the project's initiatives were focused on the Hanoi area, mainly those under component 2: Monitoring and Enforcement of Consumption Controls. Others have taken effect on the national level, such as those pertaining to improvements in the legal framework and to the raising of awareness within the government and among the general public through MOH and CCPE communication. The TE further notes that the project has developed useful tools, alliances and experiences, which can be used by other government agencies, enforcement authorities and NGOs to scale and enhance communication and enforcement efforts in Hanoi and other biodiversity and wildlife crime hotspots. There have also been discussions between MONRE and the World Bank on a follow up project to scale the results from this project in the broader context of wildlife trade, demand reduction and enforcement with funding from the GEF6 cycle. (TE p. 14)

# 9. Lessons and recommendations

## 9.1 Briefly describe the key lessons, good practices, or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

* Combatting illegal wildlife trade requires political commitment and ownership by the government. It has proven effective to mobilize a range of relevant partners in different sectors, but under the overall coordination of a specialized government agency. The BCA was here able to use its government mandate to introduce illegal wildlife trade issues into other government ministries. It could also utilize its extensive government network to amplify its messages.
* A multi-stakeholder approach is crucial for issues that are cross-sectoral in nature, like illegal wildlife trade. To reduce wildlife demand it is paramount to promote the issue across all sectors of society and include the participation of as many relevant sectors as possible. The development of such partnerships takes a considerable amount of time, effort and resources, but can be of great value as this project has shown. A follow-up project could consider using supply chain analysis to identify strategic points of intervention and the most important stakeholders, as well as try to understand how to design interventions that address motivations and attitudes as a vital aspect of the ‘knowledge attitudes practice’ theory of change.
* The sustainability of measures to combat wildlife trade requires coordinated long-term efforts that are likely best achieved through strong linkages with other established programs. The wildlife trade issue is a significant challenge that requires serious long-term commitment of official support and resources. Since there have been several ongoing efforts in Vietnam and within the region to combat wildlife trade at the time of writing, the TE recommends the Bank and the GEF to consider focusing funding via a programmatic approach rather than a single project, in order to better support the activities of the ASEAN-WEN.
* A multipronged approach at different levels, such as government, civil society and the community, is needed to combat wildlife trade. Actors on multiple levels should therefore be simultaneously targeted, using a variety of approaches customized for different groups.
* Combatting wildlife trade requires simultaneous action to improve legislation and enforcement, raise awareness, and change behaviors. These three components support each other and their synergy is essential to achieve demand reductions. (TE pp. 17-18)

## 9.2 Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation.

The TE provides two sets of recommendations, one for the World Bank and the project management unit in terms of project management, and one for follow up projects and interventions in Vietnam:

Recommendations for project management:

* For executing agencies unfamiliar with the Bank’s systems, capacity building and training in Bank procedures, including financial management, procurement and reporting, should be prioritized during the first year of the project. As project progress and disbursements are likely to be slower initially, the project plan should not assume that disbursement rates increase linearly.
* Systems once introduced for projects should be maintained for other projects as much as possible, yet staff turnover may still necessitate re-training in their use.
* Annual work plans should be prepared early, for example in 4th quarter of the previous year, in order to ensure that the plan can be approved before the new fiscal year. The procurement plan should always follow the completion of the annual work plan and the disbursement plan should follow the completion of the procurement plan, in order to ensure consistency and better coordination of disbursements with the procurement schedule.
(Workplan → Procurement Plan → Disbursement Plan)

Recommendations for follow up projects / interventions:

* A process to assess the impacts of changes in the legal framework should be put in place, establishing a set of indicators able to measure the impact on wildlife trade. A set of comprehensive indicators for the impact on wildlife trade is likely better suited to assess the completeness of the legal and policy framework in this regard. They could draw on the indicators already developed for the CBD Aichi Targets.
* Efforts to strengthen enforcement activities should include specific training for municipal enforcement agencies in anti-corruption as it relates to wildlife trade enforcement, because corruption supports illegal wildlife trade.
* Interagency cooperation should be strengthened, as intelligence-led approaches require increased cooperation between law enforcement agencies and only function effectively when adequate human resources are available for this cooperation. Within the context of this project, interagency cooperation between the Hanoi Environmental Police and the Hanoi Forest Protection Department already occurred under the enforcement campaign carried out for this project, but needs to be urgently strengthened.
* Indicators need to be designed carefully in order to be realistic. The collection of economic data on illegal or informal activities is often a challenge. Due to the risk of not being able to collect this kind of data it should not be included in the project’s results framework.
* The development of partnerships takes time and the project thus was limited in its inability to fully develop and activate some important partnerships, for example with the private sector or with other stakeholders such as the Ministry of Education and Training and the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism. More time would have been needed. (TE pp. 18-19)

# 10. Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report

A six point rating scale is used for each sub-criteria and overall rating of the terminal evaluation report (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Criteria | GEF IEO comments | Rating |
| To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives? | The TE assesses most relevant outcomes and impacts thoroughly and mostly in consistence with the project design.  | **S** |
| To what extent is the report internally consistent, the evidence presented complete and convincing, and ratings well substantiated? | The TE never fully substantiates its rating of the project development objectives, its rating given for one of the outcomes is inconsistent between sections, and although generally reasonable, ratings seemed inflated and sometimes inconsistent with the project design. | **MU** |
| To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and/or project exit strategy? | The TE provides an overall consistent assessment of sustainability. It does not take all relevant risk factors, especially financial ones, into account and provides no explicit exit strategy. | **MU** |
| To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive? | The lessons learned provided by the TE are comprehensive and supported by the evidence, but they do not explicitly address the apparent lack of an adequate M&E system. | **S** |
| Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used? | The TE includes the actual total project costs but no breakdown by activity (component). | **MS** |
| Assess the quality of the report’s evaluation of project M&E systems: | The TE does not evaluate the project's M&E system. | **U** |
| Overall TE Rating |  | **MS** |

# 11. Note any additional sources of information used in the preparation of the terminal evaluation report (excluding PIRs, TEs, and PADs).

*No additional sources were used in the preparation of this TER.*